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Role of Law Enforcement Response and Microbial Forensics in 
Investigation of Bioterrorism
The risk and threat of bioterrorism and biocrime have become a 
large concern and challenge for governments and society to enhance 
biosecurity. Law enforcement plays an important role in assessing 
and investigating activities involved in an event of bioterrorism 
or biocrime. Key to a successful biosecurity program is increased 
awareness and early detection of threats facilitated by an integrat-
ed network of responsibilities and capabilities from government, 
academic, private, and public assets. To support an investigation, 
microbial forensic sciences are employed to analyze and character-
ize forensic evidence with the goal of attribution or crime scene re-
construction. Two different molecular biology-based assays – real 
time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and repetitive element PCR 
– are described and demonstrate how molecular biology tools may 
be utilized to aid in the investigative process. Technologies relied 
on by microbial forensic scientists need to be properly validated so 
that the methods used are understood and so that interpretation of 
results is carried out within the limitations of the assays. The three 
types of validation are preliminary, developmental, and internal. 
The first is necessary for rapid response when a threat is imminent or 
an attack has recently occurred. The latter two apply to implementa-
tion of routinely used procedures.
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The use of bioweapons throughout history has 
been well-documented (1,2 and references with-
in); however, it was the delivery of Bacillus an-
thracis through the US postal system in 2001 
that raised to a new level public awareness of the 
need for biosecurity (3,4). The risk and threat 
of bioterrorism and biocrime are greater con-
cerns today because of the relative ease of acquir-
ing and preparing a pathogenic organism and the 
recognition that methods of dissemination need 
not be sophisticated or complex. These concerns 
for biosecurity have been exacerbated due to the 
recent natural outbreaks of Severe Acute Respi-
ratory Syndrome (SARS), avian influenza, and 
monkeypox. Yet, the letter attacks of 2001 and 
subsequent exaggerated reactions by the pub-
lic revealed the need for law enforcement orga-
nizations to be able to respond to such an attack 
more effectively to identify the perpetrator of the 
crime, to exclude those not associated with the 
crime, to interdict, to deter, and to prevent fu-
ture crime, and to maintain public safety and se-
curity.
This paper describes the role of law enforce-
ment in investigative and assessment activities in-
volved in a bioterrorism or biocrime event. Then 
an overview is presented of how the field of mi-
crobial forensics can assist investigations by ana-
lyzing and characterizing forensic evidence, with 
the goal of attribution or crime scene reconstruc-
tion, and includes some of the challenges to meet 
that goal. For the analytical part, two very differ-
ent molecular biology-based assays are described: 
real time PCR (RT-PCR) (5-11) and repetitive 
element PCR (rep-PCR) (12-19); these proce-
dures are used to exemplify how molecular bi-
ology tools may aid in an investigative process. 
The former approach offers high throughput, 
sensitivity, specificity, and resolution. The latter 
method is less likely to be used routinely but is 
more generic in application, offering a tool use-
ful in characterizing evidence when genomic sig-
natures are not known, and is available as a com-
mercial kit. Finally, the need for validation is 
stressed, to ensure that the methods used are un-
derstood and that interpretation of results is car-
ried out within the limitations of the assays and 
existing supporting data.
Role of law enforcement
The use or potential use of biological agents or 
their by-products as weapons to inflict harm or 
to terrorize creates biological security risks (Fig-
ure 1). Law enforcement must prepare to ad-
dress these risks by taking established approaches 
and adapting them. This is based on an appreci-
ation of novel issues that arise with the growth 
and preparation of microorganisms, the prepara-
tion of toxins, the various approaches for weap-
onization and dispersal of biothreat agents, and 
the use of synthetic biology. Because of the dual 
use of biotechnology, ease of access to technology 
and information, and low cost of development, 
it may never be possible to detect all threats and 
to prevent anti-societal actions. However, to 
best meet the needs of biosecurity, governments 
and the public should work together and take 
responsibility to prevent and minimize threats 
arising from the malicious use of microorgan-
isms. Increased awareness and early detection of 
these threats are keys to facilitating investigation 
and attribution as well as deterring some poten-
tial criminals. Foremost, an integrated network 
of responsibilities and capabilities should be de-
Figure 1. Flowchart for law enforcement for identifying and reducing risk from 
bioterrorism and biocrime.
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veloped from government, academic, private, 
and public assets. Primary to this process is that 
the legitimate use of biotechnology is promoted 
and that beneficial developments in these areas 
are not deterred by excessive oversight by law en-
forcement.
In the United States, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice, is 
the lead agency responsible for investigating acts 
of domestic bioterrorism (20). Briefly, any actu-
al or threatened use of a disease-causing micro-
organism or biological material (such as a toxin) 
directed at humans, animals, plants, or materi-
el is regarded as a crime. The possession of a bi-
ological agent, toxin, or delivery system that can-
not be justified by a prophylactic, protective, 
bona fide research effort, or other peaceful pur-
pose, can result in arrest, prosecution, fines, or 
imprisonment (21). Thus, today in the Unit-
ed States, the burden of proof has shifted to the 
defendant to prove that possession of the mate-
rial was justified. The Select Agent Rule (22) de-
fines those particularly harmful microorganisms 
(and in some cases nucleic acids) and toxins that 
are monitored and restricted (Table 1). These are 
considered to be of the greatest threat; but genet-
ic engineering and synthetic technology may in 
the future broaden the threat list. Moreover, it 
does not matter whether the perpetrator actually 
possesses the bioagent; the intent to obtain and 
use the bioagent is sufficient for arrest and pros-
ecution (21). Thus, interdiction and prosecution 
can occur even for those attempting to develop a 
weapon or for those who perpetrate hoaxes.
If an alleged incident is brought to the at-
tention of the FBI, an immediate response be-
gins with a rapid and comprehensive assessment 
of the potential threat. A Threat Credibility As-
sessment is carried out to determine whether the 
threat is technically feasible and operationally 
practical. This assessment is carried out by con-
sultation with other area experts from within the 
government (such as the Department of Health 
and Human Services – HHS, Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention – CDC, the US 
Department of Agriculture – USDA), academia 
and industry. The results of the assessment are 
incorporated into critical decisions involving the 
deployment of FBI response assets, along with 
the request, coordination, and deployment of 
other US government assets, and the notification 
of state and local authorities.
Microbial forensics
If an actual event were to occur (or a potential 
threat was interceded), authorities would use na-
tional and international scientific technical capa-
bilities to analyze evidence to assist in attribution 
of the bioagent to a source and/or reconstruc-
tion of the crime. To best exploit the value of fo-
Table 1. Center for Disease Control and Prevention high-conse-
quence pathogens and toxins (21-23)*
Category A – microorganisms that are easily disseminated or transmitted 
from person to person, can cause high mortality, have major impact on 
public health, and cause substantial social disruption. The toxin in this 





    Clostridium botulinum toxin
  Filoviruses (Ebola and Marburg)
  Arenaviruses (eg, Lassa virus, Junin virus, and Machupo virus)
Category B – microorganisms that are moderately easy to disseminate 
and cause moderate morbidity, but usually low mortality. Toxins in this 
category can cause mortality.





    Escherichia coli O157:H7
    Salmonella spp




  Alphaviruses (Venezuelan equine encephalitis, eastern equine 
   encephalitis, western equine encephalitis)
  Epsilon toxin (from Clostridium perfringens)
  Ricin (from Ricinus communis – castor bean)
    Staphylococcus enterotoxin B
Category C – emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass 
dissemination, are available, are relatively easy to produce, and have 
potential for high morbidity and mortality.
  Hantaviruses
  Nipah virus
  Tick-borne hemorrhagic fever viruses
  Tick-borne encephalitis virus
  Yellow fever virus
  Mycobacterium tuberculosis
*These pathogens are those of concern for humans. There is a list of pathogens from 
the US Department of Agriculture for plants and animals (ref 1 and citations within).
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rensic evidence, a robust microbial forensics field 
has been developed which is dedicated to the 
characterization, analysis, and interpretation of 
evidence for attribution purposes from a bioter-
rorism act, biocrime, hoax, or inadvertent agent 
release (3). Attribution in this context is the in-
formation obtained regarding the identification 
or source of a material to the degree that it can be 
ascertained (3,25). The ultimate goal of attribu-
tion is the identification of those involved in the 
perpetration of the event, which is necessary for 
criminal prosecution, to prevent additional crim-
inal acts, or for useful background for national 
policy decisions and actions.
The field of microbial forensics is multidisci-
plinary, relying heavily (but not exclusively) on 
the foundations of traditional forensic sciences, 
epidemiology, microbiology, and molecular biol-
ogy. Forensics laboratories have well-established 
procedures for all aspects of investigating crime 
scenes through the scientific analysis of evidence. 
Similar methods are being developed for micro-
bial forensics cases. The goal is to develop an in-
frastructure so that microbial forensic evidence 
will be collected, stored, analyzed, and interpret-
ed in a manner that is scientifically robust and 
thus legally defensible.
Intentional bioattacks can be classified as ei-
ther overt or covert (1,26). The difference be-
tween them is that an overt attack is often recog-
nized immediately; while a covert attack may not 
become known for some time, if at all. Covert bi-
ological attacks are by their nature more difficult 
to discover than are overt attacks. Complicating 
factors include the background of commonly oc-
curring food-borne illnesses and endemic cas-
es of emerging and re-emerging infectious dis-
eases. Separating naturally occurring outbreaks 
from those that are the result of an intention-
al attack requires an in-depth understanding of 
common domestic pathogens and their epide-
miologies. Therefore a significant challenge exists 
in developing awareness, surveillance measures, 
and methods of detection (1,27-29). The type 
of forensic information sought in such cases may 
evolve over the course of the investigation, but 
evidentiary collection is initiated at the first sign 
of an attack or potential attack. Indeed, the an-
thrax letters attack began as a covert attack and 
became an overt attack with the discovery of the 
anthrax tainted letters. Regardless, whether an 
attack is overt or covert, public (which includes 
agriculture) health officials will likely be the first 
ones involved. Law enforcement and microbial 
forensic scientist involvement would likely fol-
low the discovery of a criminal act.
Once collected and preserved, the biologi-
cal evidence is sent to a laboratory for analysis. 
Within the laboratory, a core group of analytical 
tools is available to aid in characterization of the 
evidentiary material. Because microbial forensics 
focuses on tracking and linking microorganisms 
to individuals and locations, different strategies 
may be implemented, depending on the nature 
of the attack and the type(s) of evidence collect-
ed. In an overt attack, for example, the package, 
the weapon, and associated materials, in addition 
to traditional forensic evidence (eg, hairs, fibers, 
fingerprints), may be analyzed. In a covert attack, 
the evidence may be more limited to medical his-
tories, diagnoses, and isolates taken from victims. 
In the case of the 2001 attacks, a combination of 
these methods has been and is being utilized in 
the investigation. As such, an investigative ana-
lytical plan may involve many and diverse strate-
gies (Figure 2).
While many methodologies are available, 
molecular biological tools figure prominently in 
the repertoire of the microbial forensic scientist. 
Comparative genetic sequence analyses of Select 
Agent pathogens and their near neighbors are an 
important part of the attribution process. Meth-
ods that enable recognition of nucleic acid sig-
natures will be relied on for screening potential 
candidate sources to facilitate an investigation. 
There are a variety of genetic markers (Table 2) 
and methods that allow highly specific and accu-
rate characterization of microbial diversity (30). 
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For forensic purposes, assaying rapidly evolving 
markers enables better affiliation to recent com-
mon sources, while more stable markers provide 
better lineage-based evolutionary interpretations, 
such as strain and sub-strain definition. Since 
bacteria, viruses, and some fungi reproduce asex-
ually, their genomes are considered to be clonal 
and portions of their genomes may be very sta-
ble and uninformative for distinguishing sam-
ples. Therefore, it may not be possible to individ-
ualize the source of a sample by genetic analysis 
alone (as often is accomplished in human DNA 
identity testing). Since many microbial genomes 
have relatively short generation times, in an over-
night culture, a single microbe could have repro-
duced its genome over a million times, increasing 
the chance of mutation that may be seen within 
the culture. Thus, some variation, and hence a 
forensic signature, may occur during asexual re-
production. However, there also may exist sexu-
al reproduction, horizontal gene transfer, conju-
gation, transduction, lysogeny, gene conversion, 
mobile elements, recombination, reassortment, 
gene duplication, rearrangements, and mutation-
al hotspots that can be exploited for the purposes 
of seeking forensic attribution (30,31).
The forensic comparison of a genetic pro-
file from a reference sample with that of an evi-
dentiary sample can have three possible general 
outcomes: “match” or “inclusion,” “exclusion,” 
or “inconclusive.” With microbial genetic infor-
mation, it is less likely to have a prescribed in-
terpretation policy for what constitutes a match 
and what does not. Some questions may be dif-
ficult to answer unequivocally based on extant 
data (Table 3). Uncertainty is greater than what 
is experienced for human DNA identity testing 
because of unknown diversity, limited databas-
es, unknown manipulations, and limited genetic 
testing. However, the power of microbial foren-
sic tools is increasing rapidly with ever advanc-
ing technology. Still, the questions, such as those 
listed in Table 3, must be addressed to utilize the 
full extent of microbial forensic analyses.
Even with the current degree of uncertainty, 
capabilities exist that enable analysis and inter-
Figure 2. A hypothetical sample microbial forensic analysis flowchart for 
characterizing evidence from an overt attack. The flowchart will vary depend-
ing on the type, quantity and quality of the microbial forensic evidence. An 
alternate flowchart may be considered for traditional forensic evidence.






Mobile elements, including bacteriophage, insertion elements, 
transposons, integrons, and plasmids
Pathogenicity islands




Table 3. Selected questions that genetic analyses might ad-
dress (25,27,29,30)
What might be deduced about the nature and source of the evidentiary 
 sample?
Is the pathogen detected endemic or introduced?
Do the genetic markers provide a significant amount of probative 
 information?
Does the choice of markers allow the effective comparison of samples 
 from known and questioned sources?
If such a comparison can be made, how definitively and confidently can a 
 conclusion be reached?
Is it possible that the two samples have a recent common ancestor, or 
 how long ago was there a common ancestor?
Can any sample be excluded as contaminants or recent sources of the 
 isolate?
Are there alternative explanations for the results obtained?
Where does the divergence occur within an individual gene and what are
 the mechanisms of variation?
What mechanisms are responsible for the genetic changes that 
 are detected (to include horizontal gene transfer, gene conversion, 
 recombination, gene duplication, random mutation, mutation hot spots, 
 mobile elements, etc.)?
Have host selective pressures contributed to the genetic composition of 
 a sample?
What are the effects of laboratory stresses and manipulation on genetic 
 variation?
Is there evidence of genetic engineering?
Can natural mutational events be discerned from creative or subtle 
 genetic engineering?
*The degree to which these questions can be addressed depends on the context of 
the case and the available knowledge of the genetics, phylogeny, and ecology of the 
target microorganism.
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pretation of results that can be meaningful for 
investigation purposes. At times, interpretations 
of genetic data can be made qualitatively (such 
as strain identification, ref. 1). Typically, qualita-
tive statements are made based on characteristics 
that are shared or not shared between evidentia-
ry and reference samples. Genetic analysis meth-
ods used by epidemiologists to track infectious 
disease outbreaks employ interpretation guide-
lines to evaluate the results and to determine case 
relationships in epidemics (32). Forensic analy-
ses can often use the same or similar methods but 
may require additional criteria, such as identifica-
tion of individualizing characteristics for higher 
resolution source attribution.
Technology
Methodologies are available to enable attribution 
to the level possible based on existing genetic 
data. Samples may be viable microorganisms and, 
if culturable, there will be available copious mate-
rial for forensic analyses. For non-viable materi-
als, the challenge is greater. The evidence can be 
limited in quantity and quality, sometimes being 
partially or totally degraded, contaminated with 
inhibitors and/or other background microorgan-
isms from the environment. PCR analysis will 
figure heavily in the molecular analyses of such 
genetic evidence because of the exquisite sensitiv-
ity and specificity that those particular assays af-
ford. Producing PCR amplicons of lengths of 60-
80 base pairs make it more possible to type highly 
degraded samples. The markers most suited for 
analysis with small length amplicons are Single 
Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs). A variety of 
methods is available for SNP detection (30); the 
one described briefly below is RT-PCR (5-11).
Real-time PCR
The PCR approach used for many assays is de-
signed for end-point analysis. Thus, the PCR 
products are examined at the “yield plateau” of 
the reaction. Endpoint assays, although effective, 
tend to have limited dynamic range, are at best 
only semiquantitative, and tend to be laborious 
in that they require several manipulations. The 
RT-PCR assay involves continuous monitoring 
of the generation of PCR product, particularly 
during the linear reaction phase. This provides 
both qualitative identification and quantitative 
estimation of target amounts in a single tube by 
calibrating reaction kinetics to known standards 
(6,7,11). The TaqMan® PCR assay (8,10), a 5′ 
nuclease based approach, makes RT-PCR facile 
and reliable. This assay relies on the fluorescent 
detection of unquenched reporter dye moieties 
from displaced digested probes (by Taq poly-
merase) that were hybridized to a target sequence 
of interest. The fluorescence signal should be pro-
portional to the hydrolyzed probe within the re-
gion defined by the primers in any one cycle of 
the PCR, and this is directly correlated with the 
amount of PCR product.
For SNP detection, probes can be designed 
to identify specific SNP states such that any 
non-complementarity between the probe and 
the template will disrupt the duplex conforma-
tion and probe hybridization, so that digestion is 
less favored (5). The use of minor groove binder 
(MGB) probes has greatly enhanced the perfor-
mance of RT-PCR SNP assays because the Tm 
(melting temperature) of a probe is increased, as 
compared with equivalent non-modified probes 
(9). The stability allows for MGB probes to be 
shorter and yet still achieve an acceptable probe 
Tm. The benefits of shorter probes during RT-
PCR are: 1) specificity is enhanced because a 
single mismatch will more likely destabilize the 
probe/template duplex and 2) fluorescent sig-
nal-to-noise ratios are improved because the effi-
ciency by which the fluorescence of unhybridized 
probe is quenched is directly related to the dis-
tance between the quencher moiety and report-
er dye. Shorter probes tend to allow for a closer 
proximity of the reporter dye to the quencher 
moiety, thus reducing background fluorescence 
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without affecting the signal yield that results af-
ter cleavage. Other modifications, such as use of 
Peptide Nucleic Acid molecular beacons, have 
been developed to enhance RT-PCR parameters 
for genotyping (33).
The primary benefits of the RT-PCR assay are:
• Extremely low limits of detection (ap-
proaching single copy detection);
• Inherent specificity that enables design of 
highly discriminating assays that are capable of 
distinguishing closely related molecular species;
• A broad dynamic range of quantification 
(up to 7 orders of magnitude);
• A single step reaction contained within a 
closed tube, which reduces manipulations and 
laboratory contamination; and
• Rapid automated detection in a 96-well or 
384-well format.
For most diagnostic applications, a SNP is a 
stable marker likely to have occurred only once 
in the phylogenetic history of the species (partic-
ularly at the population level). This stability can 
be invaluable for defining strain groups, such as 
major phylogenetic divisions, as well as specifi-
cally defining a particular terminal branch strain 
(eg, B. anthracis Ames strain). Moreover, when 
available, multiple SNPs along a branch provide 
the same phylogenetic information but are diag-
nostically redundant. When multiple SNPs that 
define a branch are available, then an assay can 
be optimized by choosing the SNP that contrib-
utes to the most robust (based on sensitivity and 
reproducibility) assay. Alternatively, multiple 
SNPs may be needed to increase confidence in 
interpretation when knowledge on population 
data and diversity are somewhat limited.
In addition to their use as phylogenetic re-
search tools, RT-PCR SNP assays also have been 
developed for microbial forensic application 
(4,34-37). The most notable have been SNP as-
says designed for identification of B. anthracis 
strains/isolates (34,38-40). Thousands of SNPs 
have been discovered in B. anthracis through 
whole genome sequencing (40). Indeed, Keim et 
al (34,41) have identified a number of SNPs that 
can define major genetic groups in B. anthracis. 
These diagnostic “canonical” SNPs (canSNPs) 
identify particular phylogenetic points in the evo-
lutionary history of B. anthracis (1). Both Ampli-
fied Fragment Length Polymorphisms (AFLP) 
(42) and Variable Number of Tandem Repeats 
(VNTR) (43) markers provided a phylogenet-
ic framework across several major clades (38,43) 
for assessing the informative value of potential 
canSNPs (against a diverse set of 26 strains from 
a collection of more than 1300 B. anthracis iso-
lates). One representative SNP marker from each 
of the major evolutionary branches was then se-
lected as the defining SNP for that clade (Figure 
3). Finally, each canSNP candidate was tested 
against the strain collection to support or refute 
the validity of its canonical designation (34).
Six SNPs specific for the B. anthracis “Ames” 
genetic cluster (ie, the strain identified in the an-
thrax letters attacks of 2001) were identified. 
Four chromosomal SNPs (designated Br1-7, 
Br1-26, Br1-28, Br1-31) and one plasmid SNP 
(designated PS-52 on pXO2) are diagnostic for 
the Ames strain (34) (Tables 4 and 5). Another 
Table 4. B. anthracis Ames specific Single Nucleotide Polymor-
phisms and genome position
Ames Specific SNP SNP ∆ Genome position GENBANK accession No.
PS-1* (SNPO1) A-G    7452 NC_003980
PS-52 (SNPo2) A-C   72924 NC_003981
Br1-7 C-A  433277 NC_003997
Br1-26 T-C 4624132 NC_003997
Br1-28 T-G 4929186 NC_003997
Br1-31 G-A 2749543 NC_003997
*PS-1 does cross react with isolates closely related to Ames.
Figure 3. Phylogeny based upon SNPs with branch designations. 
Branch designations are indicated in bold text and strains are compa-
rable to previous phylogenetic hypotheses (33). Highlighted numbers 
refer to strains in reference 33.
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SNP on the pXO1 plasmid (PS-1) shows slightly 
less specificity as it shares SNP identity with four 
other closely related strains (Table 5); but this 
SNP shows greater sensitivity of detection.
A dual probe allelic discrimination assay us-
ing RT-PCR (and MGB probes) has been devel-
oped for typing these canonical SNPs. The assays 
rely upon differential cleavage of allele-specific 
probes to score the SNP state of unknown B. an-
thracis DNA templates (Figure 4). The real-time 
and endpoint analysis is performed on an AB 
7900HT instrument (Applied Biosystems, Fos-
ter City, CA, USA). Quantification of DNA by 
PicoGreen® (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) 
analysis has demonstrated that as little as 10 fg 
(approximately 1.6 genome equivalents) of start-
ing DNA is sufficient to obtain robust and reli-
able real-time amplification results (based on the 
Poisson distribution). The Ames canSNP assays 
appear robust and have been successfully per-
formed under a range of validation criteria (our 
unpublished results).
Repetitive element PCR for bacteria 
identification
Repetitive sequences have been found in many 
bacterial genomes (12-15). Some stable and con-
served repetitive elements occur in lengths of 33 
and 40 bp and comprise about 1% of the bacte-
rial genome. This translates into 500 to 1000 
copies per genome (16,17). Another repetitive 
element, known as enterobacterial repetitive in-
tergenic consensus or ERIC, is 124 to 127 bp 
in length and occurs at 30 to 150 copies per ge-
nome (18). These repetitive elements are stable 
Table 5. Ames specific Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms com-
pared to close genetic relatives (33)

















PS-52 A C C C C C C
Br1-7 C A A A A A A
Br1-26 T C C C C C C
Br1-28 T G G G G G G
Br-31 A G G G G G G
PS-1* G G G G G A A
*PS-1 does cross react with isolates closely related to Ames.
Figure 4. (A) The real-time PCR analysis of Ames strain template ranging from 1.0 ng to 10 fg. (B) The endpoint analysis of Ames strain (y-axis) and 
non-Ames strain DNA templates (x-axis) ranging from 10 pg-10 fg.
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but differ in their copy number and chromosom-
al locations within and among bacterial species. 
This variation can be used for species, subspecies, 
and at times strain differentiation by a procedure 
known as rep-PCR (12-14).
The rep-PCR procedure exploits the variable 
distribution of these repetitive elements through-
out the genome of the microorganism by using 
oligonucleotide primers complementary to the 
repetitive element(s) in a PCR amplification of 
the microbial genomic DNA target. Because of 
the variation in number and location of repeti-
tive elements within a bacterial genome, many 
different length amplicons will be generated. The 
various length rep-PCR amplicons are fraction-
ated by electrophoresis. DNA patterns from dif-
ferent isolates or strains can then be compared 
to enable some degree of resolution within and 
among bacterial species. Rep-PCR is not as ran-
dom as is AFLP, since its primers target known 
conserved regions (19).
Commercially-available kits (Bacterial Bar-
codes, Athens, GA, USA) are available to facili-
tate analyses and offer increased complexity of 
the repetitive element profiles by using primer 
sequences for several distinct repetitive elements. 
Therefore, more fragments may be generated, re-
sulting in better differentiation of strains.
In the United States, there were 33 589 doc-
umented cases of Salmonella infection in 2003 
(44). Thus, Salmonella is an epidemiologically 
important microorganism. This organism also 
has been used previously as a bioweapon to inten-
tionally contaminate public food sources (2,45). 
Consequently, Salmonella is well-characterized 
(46-48) and is a good model for testing the ef-
ficacy of genetic tools for attribution. The rep-
PCR analysis is not expected to be used routine-
ly to examine Salmonella, but Salmonella typing 
can exemplify the degree of resolution that may 
be attained (49).
Figure 5 displays profiles from several strains 
of Salmonella that can be differentiated along 
with a tree derived from the data using Diversi-
lab version 3.1 (Diversilab, Athens, GA) analyti-
cal software. Thus, by using this rapid assay some 
strain resolution is demonstrated. For example, 
the discrimination potential between S. newport 
and S. infantis is very good. However, four dis-
tinct strains of S. typhimurium have very similar 
rep-PCR profiles, making it difficult to differ-
entiate these strains, and one strain of S. infan-
tis is more similar to the S. typhimurium strains 
than to another example of S. infantis. Therefore, 
while the rep-PCR technique can generally dis-
tinguish differences between strains, the presence 
of the same profile may not provide strong evi-
dence of common origin.
There may be times when an urgent need 
for a quick characterization of a pathogenic or-
ganism is needed; in such situations the rep-
PCR may be one viable option. The advantages 
of the rep-PCR are that it does have some dis-
criminatory power, can be implemented rap-
idly so results can be obtained quickly, does not 
necessarily require a priori knowledge of genetic 
signatures, and the cost of implementation and 
use is relatively low. The primary disadvantages 
are the lower discriminatory power of the analy-
sis compared with more specific assays, and the 
fact that the rep-PCR process is more refracto-
ry to template quality and quantity. In contrast, 
the RT-PCR focuses on specific sites of high res-
olution for lineage or for forensic discrimination 
and is more likely to provide results from highly 
degraded and limited quantity samples. Howev-
er, RT-PCR requires substantially more develop-
ment time to identify the markers of interest and 
validate the methodology.
Validation
The reliability and proper interpretation of re-
sults rely substantially on understanding the per-
formance and limitations of an assay. Validity 
and rigor are essential for the tools of microbial 
forensics, for determination of quality and for es-
tablishing confidence in results attained in anal-
Croat Med J 2007;48:437-439
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yses. Quality Assurance guidelines have been de-
veloped (3,25) and are similar to those adopted 
for human DNA forensic analyses (50). The sec-
tion (Section 8 of the guidelines) related to vali-
dation is listed below:
8.1 The laboratory should use validated meth-
ods and procedures for analyses.
8.1.1 Developmental validation should be 
appropriately documented and should address 
specificity, sensitivity, reproducibility, bias, pre-
cision, false-positives, false-negatives, and deter-
mine appropriate controls. Any reference data-
base used should be documented.
8.1.2 Preliminary validation is the acquisition 
of limited test data to enable an evaluation of a 
method used to provide investigative support to 
investigate a biocrime or bioterrorism event. If 
the results are to be used for other than investiga-
tive support, then a panel of peer experts, exter-
nal to the laboratory, should be convened to as-
sess the utility of the method and to define the 
limits of interpretation and conclusions drawn.
8.1.3 Internal validation should be performed 
and documented by the laboratory.
8.1.3.1 The procedure should be tested using 
known samples. The laboratory should monitor 
and document the reproducibility and precision 
and define reportable ranges of the procedure us-
ing control(s).
8.1.3.2 Before the introduction of a new pro-
cedure into sample analysis, the analyst or exami-
nation team should successfully complete a qual-
ifying test for that procedure.
8.1.3.3 Material modifications made to an-
alytical procedures should be documented and 
subjected to validation testing commensurate 
with the modification and have documented ap-
proval.
Validation is an essential process by which a 
procedure is evaluated to determine its efficacy 
and reliability for analysis. The fundamental cat-
egories of validation are developmental valida-
tion, internal validation and preliminary valida-
tion. Developmental validation is the acquisition 
of test data and the determination of conditions 
and limitations of a newly developed methodolo-
gy for use on samples. Internal validation is an ac-
cumulation of test data within the laboratory to 
demonstrate that established methods and pro-
cedures perform within determined limits in the 
laboratory. These two types of validation are cru-
cial for addressing the reliability and robustness 
of any method routinely implemented in the lab-
oratory.
Preliminary validation, however, is not de-
scribed in the human DNA forensic arena, but 
is essential when addressing biodefense and bios-
ecurity. One cannot predict which microorgan-
Figure 5. Rep-PCR profiles, relatedness tree, and similarity index for ten Salmonella enteritidis serotypes. Note lack of diversity in 4 typhimurium 
strains and greater similarity between an infantis strain and typhimurium strains than with another infantis strain. Also, note discriminatory power for 
two Newport strains and two infantis strains. All isolates were collected from unrelated events. The DNAs were kindly provided by Eugene LeClerc 
(FDA).
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ism, virus, or toxin will be used in the next attack 
(planned, attempted, or successful) or the next 
hoax. Yet, authorities will need to respond expe-
ditiously to protect the public and the country’s 
assets. If there are no established validated stan-
dard operating protocols to identify or character-
ize the bioweapon, it is incumbent upon the mi-
crobial forensic scientists and others to identify 
any tools that are available to assist in the investi-
gation even if they have been used previously for 
research purposes only. It would be irresponsible 
to wait for months or years (as is done for human 
identity testing) for validation of an analytical 
procedure when an attack is under way and bi-
osecurity is threatened. However, quality of the 
methods used and understanding the limitations 
of a methodology should not be overlooked. 
Therefore, the concept of preliminary validation 
was developed. Preliminary validation is the ac-
quisition of limited test data to enable an evalua-
tion of a method used to assess materials derived 
from a biocrime or bioterrorism event. The eval-
uation is based on peer review of extant data, typ-
ically by a panel of experts that determines the 
extent of use and limitations of the technology 
or methodology and makes recommendations of 
evaluations or studies that may be needed prior 
to processing evidentiary material or studies that 
may be carried out subsequent to analyses and 
results are obtained. The goal is to be able to re-
spond expeditiously, effectively, and efficiently 
while maintaining scientifically valid and rigor-
ous approaches.
Validation of a procedure includes addressing 
many parameters. Some of these are listed in Ta-
ble 6. While not all parameters may be applicable 
for any one assay, they should be considered to 
ascertain whether they apply. By using appropri-
ate validation criteria, the reliable conditions can 
be determined for the methodology or for the in-
terpretation of the analytical results. In addition, 
conditions can be defined under which the re-
sults or the standard interpretation are not valid.
Conclusion
Many nations are faced with the possibility of a 
biological attack, and discovering, attributing, 
and prosecuting these cases pose serious chal-
lenges for law enforcement. The best approach 
for preparedness to detect and/or respond to an 
event is an effective integrated network with gov-
ernment, academia, industry, and the public all 
contributing to this common goal. The field of 
microbial forensics has been implemented to en-
able better confidence in scientific analyses of fo-
rensic evidence and to gain greater confidence in 
the interpretations of the results obtained. Prog-
ress in microbial forensics is currently focused on 
a number of areas to address (52-54), including:
• Sample collection and preservation strat-
egies,
Table 6. Minimum validation criteria (24,50,51)
Sensitivity – is the minimum amount or concentration of analyte required 
 to generate a reliable result
Specificity – is the ability to measure the intended target analyte or 
 signature
Reproducibility – is the closeness of agreement between the results of 
 successive measurements of the same analyte under similar but not
 necessarily identical conditions
Precision – is the degree that measurements are similar
Accuracy – is the degree that the measured material or analyte is similar
 to its true value*
Resolution – is smallest difference between measurements that can be 
 meaningfully distinguished
Reliability – is the closeness of agreement between the results of 
 successive measurements of the same analyte under the same 
 conditions of measurement
Robustness – ability of analytical performance under challenged 
 conditions or when analyzing challenged samples
Specified samples – are those necessary to test the performance of 
 the assay (eg, reference panels and mock or non-probative materials) 
 corresponding with the intended application of the assay
Purity – is the quality required for extracted analyte to be analyzed
Input values – is the range of quantity of analyte that can be analyzed 
 reliably
Quantitation – is the amount or concentration of material for input
Dynamic range – is the range of values or limits where precision is held
Limit of detection – is the lowest concentration of analyte that can be 
 consistently detected
Controls – are defined test materials for the measured analyte (includes 
 blind samples, negative and positive controls)
Window of performance for operational steps of assay – parameters 
 such that slight analytical condition variation will not substantially affect 
 performance or reliability
Critical equipment calibration – are those requiring calibration prior to 
 their initial use and on a regular basis thereafter
Critical reagents – are determined by empirical studies or routine 
 practice to require testing on known samples prior to use with 
 evidentiary materials in order to prevent unnecessary consumption of 
 forensic samples
Databases – a collection of data to be used to support interpretation of 
 results
*The term “analyte” is used here in a broad sense and can range from intact viable 
microorganism to an ion.
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• Novel methods and analyses for typing 
non-viable and/or trace materials,
• Development of validated methodologies 
that define the limits of an analysis,
• Identification of genetic markers and match 
criteria that can establish baselines for comparing 
reference and evidence samples, and
• Interpretation criteria,
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